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Abstract 
 
Since the early 1980s, electricity industry reforms have been initiated in more than half of the 
countries in the world. Among the primary targets of these reform schemes, there has been an 
increase in efficiency of the sector; and it is implicitly assumed that government support to 
energy technology R&D will progress in line with the reform process as the former is 
required to sustain improved efficiency in the middle and long run. The paper reviews the 
relation between reform process in electricity markets and government support to energy R&D. Using 
panel data from 27 countries covering the period from 1974 to 2008, this study aims at 
finding out to what extent the expected correlation between reform process and government 
support to energy R&D has in practice been materialized so far. The findings suggest that, 
contrary to expectations, the progress toward electricity market reform is associated with 
reduced government support to a variety of energy R&D activities, which threatens 
sustainable efficiency improvements in the power industry.  
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1. Introduction 
 
By the 1980s, a number of political, financial and technical factors converged and started to 
undermine the logic that electricity industry should be handled via a vertically integrated (and 
usually state-owned) monopoly [1]. Among these factors, there were ideological reasons
1
, 
development of gas-fired combined cycle gas turbines
2
 (CCGTs), improvement in 
information and communication technologies, questions about the efficiency of vertically 
integrated utilities (whether publicly owned or regulated by public) and poor performance of 
existing utilities especially in developing countries. The power sector reform began in Chile 
in 1982 for the first time and then spread through various countries in the world especially 
after the 1990s. As suggested by Sioshansi [3], Dubash [4] and Reddy [5], this was a true 
paradigm shift. This shift has also been strongly encouraged by the World Bank, IMF and 
other international financial institutions. In 1992, the World Bank officially changed its 
lending policy for electricity development from traditional project lending to policy lending. 
That is, any country borrowing from the Bank on power projects would have to agree to move 
away from a “single national electricity utility as a public monopoly” and adopt ownership, 
structural and regulatory reforms [6]. Other international financial institutions, such as the 
Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the 
Inter-American Development Bank have followed the suit [7]. Today, reforms are ongoing in 
many countries and reform process in the power sector is regarded as not only possible and 
necessary, but also inevitable. 
 
The main aim of liberalization process in power industry has been to improve the efficiency 
in the sector. Besides, it is implicitly assumed that, in line with reform process, government 
support to R&D in energy technology will also increase as it is another component (together 
with reform process) of the policy aiming at increasing efficiency in electricity sector. It is 
argued that governments will have an incentive to engage in and increase R&D because the 
main source of efficiency improvement in the sector lies in long-term technical progress 
                                                 
1
 In the United Kingdom, for example, privatization of state owned electricity utility reinforced the ideology of 
the Thatcher government and its interest in reducing the costs of domestic coal subsidies. Similar ideological and 
political explanations can be found from Norway to New Zealand. ([2] Hogan WW. Electricity Market 
Restructuring: Reforms of Reforms. J Regul Econ. 2002;21:103-32.) 
2
 The advent of highly efficient CCGTs made it possible to build small units in relatively short time with little 
risk, which eliminated the significant barriers that had previously existed to entry in power generation. 
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encouraged by R&D. Evidence suggests that electricity sector reforms can achieve (short-
term) operating efficiency through cost saving and the spread of best practice. The logical 
addition to this argument is that liberalization will also lead to improved R&D to maintain 
improved efficiency in the middle and long term. In this paper, we question whether this is the 
case or not. We try to answer following research questions: (i) what is the impact of 
electricity market reforms on government support to R&D in energy technology? (ii) does 
liberalization effect different kinds of energy technologies (such as fossil fuel, nuclear, 
renewable power technologies) in different directions or does it have the same effect for all 
sorts of technologies? (iii) what are the other factors (apart from reform process) that 
influence government support to energy technology R&D and how much are they influential 
relative to reform process? 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section provides the conceptual framework and presents 
a literature review. Section 3 overviews data. Section 4 summarizes the methodological 
framework. Following section presents empirical analysis and discusses the results. Section 6 
mentions potential limitations of the study. The last section concludes, presenting policy 
implications of the study. 
 
2. Conceptual framework and literature review 
 
Jamasb et al. [8] classify approaches to analyzing electricity reforms into three broad 
categories: (i) econometric methods, (ii) efficiency and productivity analysis methods, and 
(iii) individual or comparative case studies. They argue that econometric studies are best 
suited to the analysis of well-defined issues and the testing of hypotheses through statistical 
analysis of reform determinants and performance. According to them, efficiency and 
productivity analyses are suitable for measuring the effectiveness with which inputs are 
transformed into outputs, relative to best practice. Jamasb et al. [8] also maintain that single or 
multi-country case studies are suitable when in-depth investigation or qualitative analysis is 
needed. Within this classification, our study well suits the first category; that is, an 
econometric study focusing on cross-country evidence on the impact of electricity market 
reforms.  
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The link between market liberalization policies and government support to R&D is one of the 
least explored areas in the literature; and one between power market reforms and government 
support to energy R&D is not explored at all. So, in this section we cannot cite previous 
empirical studies similar to ours as, to our best knowledge, this is the first study in this area. 
Instead, we present non-econometric studies on the relationship between liberalization and 
government support to R&D. 
 
Dooley [9] argues that many advanced industrialized nations are substantially reducing their 
national (public and private) investments in energy R&D, driven in part by changes occurring 
as a result of the deregulation of these nations’ energy sectors. In particular, he continues, 
funding for strategic energy R&D aimed at developing future energy supply options (e.g., 
fusion, fission, ‘clean’ fossil energy, renewable energy) has been decreased substantially in 
both the public and private sectors in many of these nations. He also maintains that these 
trends are starting to be seen in the United States as it moves towards the deregulation of the 
nation’s utilities. The magnitude of the reductions in support for energy R&D in the public 
and private sectors and the shift towards decidedly shorter-term R&D has profound 
implications for nations approaching deregulation. He concludes though utility customers 
may be short-term winners from the deregulation of utilities by paying less for energy, a 
national failure to invest in energy R&D is very likely to have long-term negative impacts on 
national energy sectors, the economies, and environmental wellbeing. 
 
Aggarwal [10] analyses the effects of the deregulation policy introduced in India in the mid-
1980s on the relationship between technology imports and in-house R&D efforts. Using 
statistical techniques, Aggarwal [10] examines the interactions between policy regime, 
economic environment and the determinants of inter-industry variation in technology imports 
in Indian manufacturing. In doing so, he introduces R&D efforts as one of the main 
determinants. The empirical results reveal that deregulation promoted complementarity 
between technology imports and R&D efforts significantly. The results also suggest that after 
deregulation, the impact of product differentiation, demand conditions and technology-related 
factors increased significantly in determining the inter-industry patterns of technology 
imports. Thus, unlike in a regulated regime where technology imports are viewed important 
for filling gaps in domestic technological capabilities, in a deregulated regime technology 
upgrade seems to be the major role of technology imports. 
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Calderini and Garrone [11] investigate the relationship between market structure and the 
composition of R&D activities. They present an empirical model to demonstrate that when 
market structure is shuffled by an institutional discontinuity, such as liberalization, basic and 
applied activities respond in opposite ways: the former decrease whereas the latter increase. 
As a consequence, they argue, market turmoil is likely to provide firms with short-term 
incentives, shifting the allocation of resources towards applied and development activities. 
They tested the model on a data set including innovation measures from the incumbent public 
telecommunications operators of 17 European countries. They conclude that the dynamics 
outlined in the model are likely to prevent firms (industries) sustaining an appropriate rate of 
innovative activity. 
 
Katrak [12] focuses on concerns that India’s recent economic liberalization measures will 
result in a neglect of the development of indigenous technologies and will make increasing 
use of imported technologies and/or of standardized technologies. Katrak [12] argues that the 
comparative advantages of the different types of technologies will depend on certain 
enterprise-level characteristics, including age and size, and consequently enterprises that use 
the technologies based on their in-house R&D efforts may perform well even under a 
liberalized regime. Empirical tests, using data of enterprises in three major industry groups, 
gave results consistent with these arguments. The paper finds that over the period 1991–1998 
the growth performance of enterprises that make products based on their in-house R&D 
efforts have compared favorably with those of other enterprises, in two of the industries. 
 
Bowonder and Satish [13] provide another review of impact of liberalization polices on R&D 
in India. They argue that before the start of liberalization in 1991 the Indian economy was an 
inward looking system under government control but following the drive to liberalization it 
has changed in many ways. For a start, the national system of innovation has been affected by 
exposure to market forces. Global firms have founded R&D centers in India and large private 
firms have increased spending on R&D. They also state that patentable innovations have 
shown a sharp rise since the opening up of the economy. As a percentage of GNP, however, 
R&D expenditure is still much lower than that observed in countries such as China, Taiwan, 
and Brazil. They conclude that the Indian share of world trade is very low, and so there is a 
need for further expansion of R&D initiatives.  
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Runci and Dooley [14] review R&D spending on energy technologies in various countries. 
They find that the majority of the countries with high R&D spending on energy technologies 
made large cuts in energy R&D support during the 1990s. They find that restructuring and 
deregulation of the energy industries have been strongly correlated with energy R&D funding 
cuts; and France and Japan are the only major energy R&D-performing countries that have 
not yet restructured their energy industries. 
 
Jamasb et al. [15] provides another case study that presents the relationship between 
liberalization an R&D. Their paper is a critical assessment of the current balance of efforts 
towards energy R&D and the promotion of low-carbon electricity technologies in the UK. 
They review the UK’s main technological options and their estimated cost ranges in the 
medium term. They contrast the energy R&D spending with the current and expected future 
cost of renewable promotion policies and point out the high cost of carbon saving through 
existing renewable promotion arrangements. They note that liberalization of the electricity 
sector has had significant implications for the landscape of energy R&D in the UK. They 
argue that there is a need for reappraisal of the soundness and balance of the energy R&D and 
renewable capacity deployment efforts towards new energy technologies. They suggest that 
the cost-effectiveness of UK deployment policies needs to be more closely analyzed as 
associated costs are non-trivial and expected to rise. They also make a case for considering 
increasing the current low level of energy R&D expenditure. They argue that much of energy 
R&D is a public good and we should consider whether the current organization of R&D effort 
is fit for purpose. They conclude that it is important to build and maintain the research 
capability in the UK in order to absorb spillovers of technological progress elsewhere in the 
world. 
 
Finally, Jamasb and Pollitt [16] explore the reasons why electricity sector liberalization has 
coincided with a significant decline in R&D spending. They review the industrial 
organization literature on R&D and innovation to explore the likely causes of the decline in 
R&D spending in the electricity sector. Meanwhile, they argue, R&D productivity and 
innovative outputs in utilities and equipment suppliers appear to have improved; however, a 
lasting decline in R&D expenditure can have a negative long-term effect on technological 
progress and innovation in the sector. They conclude that the decline in R&D could have been 
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predicted from the literature. They also discuss the need to reorient the post-liberalization 
technology policy. 
 
Based on this brief literature review, we may argue that present literature is limited to case 
studies that focus on a single country and anecdotal discussions of possible implications of 
liberalization process on R&D activities. Cross-country econometric evidence on the impact 
of the liberalization process on R&D spending is nonexistent and will take more time to 
emerge. There exists a huge research gap in this area and this paper constitutes one of the first 
efforts to fill this gap using cross-country empirical data. 
 
3. Overview of data 
 
Our data set is based on a panel of 27 countries
3
 for a period beginning in 1974 and extending 
through 2008. Selection of time period and countries in the sample is determined by data 
availability. Because of the missing observations, our panel is unbalanced. Since our panel 
dataset includes data on 27 countries for 35 years, the possible maximum number of 
observations for each variable is 945 (27x35). 
 
The variables used in the study are total energy R&D budget, R&D budget for energy 
efficiency, R&D budget for fossil fuels, R&D budget for nuclear energy, R&D budget for 
renewable energy sources, electricity market reform score, energy self-sufficiency, energy 
intensity of GDP and real GDP per capita. 
 
The data on government energy technology R&D budgets are obtained from IEA [17]. 
Budgets are available for several R&D activities: energy efficiency, fossil fuels, renewable 
energy sources and nuclear energy. Data for 27 IEA member countries are available. Figure 1 
presents government energy technology R&D budgets in 2007. As can be seen in the figure, 
US, Japan, France and Korea are responsible for most of the government energy technology 
R&D spending in 2007. 
 
                                                 
3
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
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Figure 1. Government energy technology R&D budgets in 2007 
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Electricity market reform score variable takes the values from 0 to 8; depending on how many 
of the following reform steps have been taken in each country and each year: (1) introduction 
of independent power producers, (2) corporatization of state-owned enterprises, (3) law for 
electricity sector liberalization, (4) introduction of unbundling, (5) establishment of electricity 
market regulator, (6) introduction of privatization, (7) establishment of wholesale electricity 
market, and (8) choice of supplier. To build this variable, we created 8 dummy variables for 
each of the reform steps mentioned above and calculated the total number of reform steps 
taken in each country and each year. Dummy variables for reform steps are created based on 
the data collected and cross-checked from various international and national energy 
regulators’ web sites4. Figure 2 presents the changes in reform score variable for the countries 
in our sample from 1990 to 2008. 
 
                                                 
4
 The full list of sources from which data are obtained can be found at IERN web site (http://www.iern.net). 
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Figure 2. Electricity market reform scores in 1990 and 2008 
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The variable “energy self-sufficiency” is calculated by dividing primary energy production by 
primary energy supply for each country and each year. Energy intensity of GDP is used to 
measure how much energy is used to generate a unit of GDP. It is calculated by dividing 
primary energy supply by total GDP. Figure 3 shows these two variables for 2008. The data 
on primary energy production and primary energy supply come from IEA [18], while data on 
GDP and real GDP per capita are obtained from CIC [19] and World Bank [20]. As shown in 
the figure, only Australia, Canada, Denmark and Norway are self-sufficient in energy while 
Canada, Finland, Czech Republic, Korea and USA are the countries with highest GDP energy 
intensity figures. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables in our analysis. 
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Figure 3. Energy self-sufficiency and energy intensity of GDP in 2008 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables in the model 
 
Variables (Units) # of obs. # of countries Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total Energy R&D Budget 
(million $, 2008 prices and PPP) 
671 25 581 1163 0 9,022 
R&D Budget for Energy Efficiency 
(million $, 2008 prices and PPP) 
675 26 52 112 0 696 
R&D Budget for Fossil Fuels 
(million $, 2008 prices and PPP) 
679 25 74 186 0 1,924 
R&D Budget for Nuclear Energy 
(million $, 2008 prices and PPP) 
679 26 308 660 0 4,294 
R&D Budget for Renewable Energy Sources 
(million $, 2008 prices and PPP) 
691 27 50 124 0 1,529 
Reform Score [0-8] 945 27 2.65 3.22 0 8 
Energy Self-Sufficiency (1=self-sufficient) 945 27 0.73 1.18 0.001 9.45 
Energy Intensity of GDP 
(mtoe per billion $ GDP) 
916 27 0.29 0.18 0.08 1.26 
Real GDP per capita 
(current international $ and PPP) 
916 27 17,625 11,123 1,180 88,335 
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4. Methodology 
 
As underlined by Jamasb et al. [8], there is a lack of generally accepted and measured 
indicators for monitoring the progress, impacts, and performance of electricity sector reforms. 
Since the aim of this paper is to propose a framework for analyzing the impact of the power 
market reforms on government support to energy R&D, we face with the same problem. That 
is, we need to, first, evaluate possible impact of reforms on government support to energy 
R&D; second, decide which indicators to use in our study and; finally, specify methods to 
measure them. Let me focus on these tasks one by one. 
 
To our best knowledge, no applied study has been done so far on the possible implications of 
the power market reform process on government support to energy R&D. Therefore, we 
cannot find empirical evidence in the literature for or against the positive or negative impact 
of the reform initiatives on government support to energy R&D. To carry out the analysis 
suggested above, we need to decide which indicators to be used in the study. Since we are 
interested in the impact of the power market reforms on government support to energy R&D, 
we need variables representing government spending in various energy R&D activities and a 
variable representing the scale and intensity of the reform. In addition to these variables, we 
also utilize a set of control variables (GDP per capita, energy intensity of GDP, energy self-
sufficiency), which are assumed to be endogenous to reform process and explain a portion of 
the variations in government support to energy R&D. Another challenge we face in this study 
relates to the measurement of the variables. For an indicator to be useful it needs to be based 
on a clear definition and to be measurable. This is equally important whether it is expressed in 
physical, monetary or qualitative terms. In fact, most of the economic and industry indicators 
in our study are measured in some form of monetary or physical unit; and therefore, easy to 
include into the study. However, the extent and scope of electricity reforms are not 
quantifiable in physical or monetary units. The main electricity reform measures, such as 
privatization, unbundling of functions, wholesale markets and independent regulation, are 
generally established gradually and have a qualitative dimension. Accounting for these 
measures with the use of dummy variables, as is sometimes done, does not reflect extent or 
intensity. To overcome this problem, as discussed in Jamasb et al. [8], a practical approach 
has been to construct a power market reform score variable. In this study, we adopt this 
approach and form a reform indicator. 
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It is almost impossible to observe the real impact of power market reforms on government 
support to energy R&D without separating the effects of market reform from other country 
specific features. Therefore, we specify our dependent variables (that is, government support 
to various energy-related R&D activities) as a function of (i) electricity market reform score 
(a comparable cross-country reform indicator), (ii) a set of controls (GDP per capita, energy 
intensity of GDP, energy self-sufficiency), (iii) country-specific effects (these are assumed to 
be exogenous and to exist independently of reform process, but may explain a portion of the 
variation in government support to energy R&D) and (iv) other unobserved variables that 
influence government support to energy R&D. These variables are then used in panel 
regressions to assess their impact on variables we are interested in. In panel regressions, the 
exploitation of both cross-country and time-series dimensions of the data allows for control of 
country-specific effects. Apart from reform process; government support to energy R&D in a 
specific country and year may be influenced by GDP per capita, energy intensity of GDP and 
energy self-sufficiency. In our model, we include all these variables in order to isolate the 
effect of the reform on government support to energy R&D. 
 
In this paper, we formulate regression equations as below to analyze the impact of electricity 
industry reform on government support to energy R&D. 
 1
2 1
k s
it j jit p pi it
j p
Y X Z t    
 
       (1) 
In the model, i and t represent unit of observation and time period, respectively. j and p are 
indices used to differentiate between observed and unobserved variables. Xji and Zpi represent 
observed and unobserved variables, respectively. Xji includes both reform variable and control 
variables. Yit is dependent variable. it is the disturbance term and t is time trend term. 
Because the Zpi variables are unobserved, there is no means of obtaining information about 
the p piZ component of the model. For convenience, we define a term i , known as the 
unobserved effect, representing the joint impact of the Zpi variables on Yit. So, our model may 
be rewritten as follows: 
 
1
2
i it
k
it j jit
j
tY X    

     (2) 
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Now, the characterization of the 
i  component is crucially important in the analysis. If 
control variables are so comprehensive that they capture all relevant characteristics of the 
individual, there will be no relevant unobserved characteristics. In that case, the 
i  term may 
be dropped and pooled data regression (OLS) may be used to fit the model, treating all the 
observations for all time periods as a single sample. However, since we are not sure whether 
control variables in our models capture all relevant characteristics of the countries, we cannot 
directly carry out a pooled data regression of Y on X. If we were to do so, it would generate 
an omitted variable bias. Therefore we prefer to use either a Fixed Effects (FE) or Random 
Effects (RE) regression. In FE model, the country-specific effects (
i ) are assumed to be the 
fixed parameters to be estimated. In RE model, the country-specific effects (
i ) are treated as 
stochastic. The fixed effect model produces consistent estimates, while the estimates obtained 
from the random effect model will be more efficient. Since we cannot be sure whether the 
observations in our model may be described as being a random sample from a given 
population, we cannot directly decide which regression specification (FE or RE) to use. It will 
be decided in the course of the analysis based on Hausman test. 
 
5. Empirical analysis and discussion of the results 
 
Throughout our analysis, we estimated five models to explain the impact of power market 
reforms on government spending in various energy R&D activities. Since using logarithms of 
variables enables us to interpret coefficients easily and is an effective way of shrinking the 
distance between values, we transform variables representing government spending in various 
energy R&D activities and GDP per capita variable into logarithmic form and use these new 
transformed variables in our models.  
 
We perform the empirical analysis by estimating the specification given in Equation (2) for 
each model
5
. However, as mentioned before, we cannot directly decide which regression 
specification (FE or RE) to use. Therefore, we apply Hausman test for fixed versus random 
effects in each model. To perform this test, we first estimate the fixed effects model (which is 
consistent) and store the estimates, then estimate the random-effects model (which is 
efficient) and run the test. Since we prefer 5% significance level, any p-value less than 0.05 
                                                 
5
 Throughout the paper, model estimations are carried out and cross-checked by StataSE 11.1 and Eviews 7.1. 
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implies that we should reject the null hypothesis of there being no systematic difference in the 
coefficients. In short, Hausman test with a p-value up to 0.05 indicates significant differences 
in the coefficients. Therefore, in such a case, we choose fixed effects model. However, if p-
value from Hausman test is above 0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of there being no 
systematic difference in the coefficients at 5% level. In such cases, Hausman test does not 
indicate significant differences in the coefficients. Therefore, we provisionally choose random 
effects. After that, we apply Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (BPLM) test for 
random effects in order to decide on using either pooled OLS or random effects in our 
analysis. This test is developed to detect the presence of random effects. In this test, the null 
hypothesis is that variances of groups are zero; that is, there is no unobserved heterogeneity, 
all groups are similar. If the null is not rejected, the pooled regression model is appropriate. 
That is, if the p-value of BPLM test is below 0.05, we reject the null, meaning that random 
effects specification is the preferred one. If it is above 0.05, we prefer pooled OLS 
specification to carry out our regression. Table 2 presents estimation results for each model, 
including estimation output, number of observations and countries included in the model 
estimation, results of Hausman and BPLM tests and preferred specifications based on these 
tests. 
 
It is not easy to draw conclusions about the impact of extensive electricity market reforms in 
various countries from empirical work that focuses on a single market or from other country-
specific anecdotal discussion of reform processes because neither type of study distinguishes 
the effects of reform from country-specific features. Therefore, our empirical approach was to 
take advantage of the diversity in electricity reform patterns in various countries and to 
control for a number of potential explanatory variables to predict the impact of electricity 
market reforms on government support to energy R&D. Panel analysis of the trends in 
government support to energy R&D (using reform variables, country macroeconomic and 
other structural features) offers objective evidence on the observed impact of reforms at a 
macro level. 
 
 Table 2. Estimation Results 
 
Models 
Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
t-stat. 
p 
value 
Number of  Number of  Hausman Test Preferred 
(country group) countries observations Statistic p-value Specification 
Model 1 Log of total energy Reform score [0-8] -0.089
***
 0.012 -7.600 0.00 25 670 6616.52 0.0000 Fixed Effects 
 
R&D budget Energy self-sufficiency 0.230
***
 0.034 6.810 0.00 
     
  
Energy intensity of GDP 0.691
**
 0.313 2.210 0.03 
     
  
Log of GDP per capita 0.268
**
 0.115 2.340 0.02 
         Constant 2.087
*
 1.152 1.810 0.07           
Model 2 Log of R&D budget for  Reform score [0-8] -0.055
***
 0.018 -3.080 0.00 27 679 3107.53 0.0000 Fixed Effects 
 
renewable energy sources Energy self-sufficiency 0.143
***
 0.054 2.670 0.01 
     
  
Energy intensity of GDP -1.144
**
 0.479 -2.390 0.02 
     
  
Log of GDP per capita 0.397
**
 0.175 2.260 0.02 
       Constant -0.820 1.768 -0.460 0.64           
Model 3 Log of R&D budget for  Reform score [0-8] -0.070
***
 0.016 -4.340 0.00 26 613 4638.88 0.0000 Fixed Effects 
 
nuclear energy Energy self-sufficiency 0.299
***
 0.054 5.500 0.00 
     
  
Energy intensity of GDP 0.904
**
 0.423 2.140 0.03 
     
  
Log of GDP per capita -0.530
***
 0.160 -3.320 0.00 
       Constant 8.477
***
 1.609 5.270 0.00           
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Model 4 Log of R&D budget for  Reform score [0-8] -0.168
***
 0.024 -7.110 0.00 25 636 4746.69 0.0000 Fixed Effects 
 
fossil fuels Energy self-sufficiency 0.246
***
 0.079 3.120 0.00 
     
  
Energy intensity of GDP 0.973 0.613 1.590 0.11 
     
  
Log of GDP per capita 0.479
**
 0.235 2.040 0.04 
       Constant -2.200 2.357 -0.930 0.35           
Model 5 Log of R&D budget for  Reform score [0-8] -0.056
***
 0.020 -2.860 0.00 25 641 2530.39 0.0000 Fixed Effects 
 
energy efficiency Energy self-sufficiency -0.251
***
 0.066 -3.800 0.00 
     
  
Energy intensity of GDP -1.566
***
 0.538 -2.910 0.00 
     
  
Log of GDP per capita -0.055 0.197 -0.280 0.78 
       Constant 3.989
**
 1.987 2.010 0.05           
***
 Coefficients that are significant at 1% level. 
  
**
 Coefficients that are significant at 5% level. 
    
*
 Coefficients that are significant at 10% level. 
When we look at the results from this study, we see that electricity market reform score 
variables have a negative relationship with variables representing government support to 
various energy R&D activities. Our interpretation of the results in detail is as follows: 
 
(1) In the first model, our empirical findings support the idea that reform process causes a 
decline in total government energy R&D spending. On average, government of a 
country with no reform at all allocates 0.7% more budget on energy R&D compared to 
that of a country where all reforms steps are taken. On the other hand, energy self-
sufficiency, energy intensity of GDP and GDP per capita seem to be both positively 
correlated with government energy R&D spending and much more influential on 
government support to energy R&D compared to reform process. That is to say, 
countries supplying a higher share of their energy needs from domestic sources and 
having more energy intense GDPs and those with higher per capita income invest 
more in R&D. For instance, 10% increase in GDP per capita results in 2.7% increase 
in government budget for R&D related activities. 
(2) The trends in R&D budgets for renewable energy sources (Model 2) also follow the 
general tendency with the exception that there is a negative relationship between R&D 
budgets for renewable energy sources and energy intensity of GDP. That is, countries 
with more energy intense GDPs spend less money for renewable energy R&D. This 
conclusion seems reasonable when we take into account the fact that countries with 
more energy intense GDPs are interested in technologies that are capable of producing 
large amount of energy to meet their significant energy needs (rather than renewable 
technologies that produce clean but lower amounts of energy). 
(3) In the third model, we see that nuclear power R&D spending also follows general 
trends. The only exception is that there is a negative relationship between income level 
and R&D spending on nuclear technology, meaning that as countries get richer they 
tend to abandon nuclear technology. 
(4) R&D spending on fossil fuel technologies is completely in line with our general 
observations; however, the positive relationship between R&D spending on fossil fuel 
technologies and energy intensity of GDP is not statistically significant even at 10% 
level. 
(5) In the last model, we again see a negative relationship between R&D spending on 
energy efficiency and reform process. On the other hand, we could not detect a 
statistically significant impact of income level on energy efficiency R&D spending. 
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Besides, our results imply that energy self-sufficient countries spend less on energy 
efficiency related technologies. Similarly, our findings suggest that countries with 
more energy intense GDPs allocate a lower amount of budget on energy efficiency 
related technologies than those with less energy intense GDPs. 
(6) We see that country specific features tend to have a high power in explaining 
government support to energy R&D spending in almost all models.  
 
To sum up, our results reveal that the progress toward the electricity market reform is 
associated with less government spending on energy technology R&D. However, although 
our conclusions verify the idea that electricity market reform process (with privatization, 
liberalization and vertical disintegration) discourages government energy R&D spending; it 
does not necessarily involve a judgment on the overall success or failure of the reform 
process. It may be argued that the reform process has just started or is still under progress in 
many countries and today it is too early to measure its impact. This and similar arguments 
cannot be rejected straight away. Today, what we may argue correctly is that, as a result of 
reforms, a decline in government spending on energy technology R&D has been observed so 
far. 
 
6. Limitations of the study 
 
The research may have a number of limitations that we acknowledge. In fact, we have no 
reason to believe that any of these limitations should be existent in our analysis, but cannot of 
course rule them out. 
 
To begin with, like all other econometric studies on electricity reform, the issue of 
endogeneity may be raised in our study. The analysis dealt to some extent with this potential 
problem by including country and year fixed effects. The country fixed effects control for 
country-specific propensities to reform and matters such as institutional characteristics, and 
year fixed effects control for any general trend in the reform of electricity sector.  
 
Second shortcoming may originate from the lack of data. Due to limited nature of our data set, 
we could not properly account for the impact of some other variables on government support 
to energy R&D like institutional characteristics, technological innovations and changes to 
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regulatory practices. It should also be added that a more accurate assessment (incorporating 
private industry support) of total national R&D efforts directed at energy technology is 
difficult to obtain due to a lack of data and to variations in the way private industry’s energy 
technology R&D is measured from one country to another. Besides, with liberalization 
process, data on energy R&D in the private sector has become more commercially sensitive 
and, therefore, less available. Hence, in this study, we focused only on public R&D spending 
and ignored private contribution into energy technology R&D. 
 
Some aspects of electricity reforms are not readily quantifiable in physical or monetary units. 
The main issue is that simple observation of the fact that some reform steps have been taken 
does not reflect their characteristics and extent [8]. That is to say, objective comparisons 
across countries are inherently difficult in any study and our analysis is not an exception. The 
main steps of electricity reform process are usually established progressively and have a 
qualitative dimension. Accounting for these measures with the use of dummy variables does 
not reveal their true scope or intensity. To lessen the impact of this drawback, we did not use 
individual dummy variables for reform elements in this study. Instead, we constructed a 
power market reform score indicator to reflect scale and scope of the reform process. 
Although such an approach seems a practical and reasonable representation of the reform 
process, we cannot argue that we reflected all characteristics of various reform processes in 
our study. 
 
Finally, any measurement error and omission of explanatory variables may bias estimates of 
all coefficients in the models. However, in our study, omitted variables may be captured at 
least in part by the country-specific effects, mitigating the potential for bias.  
 
7. Policy implications and conclusion 
 
Energy technologies are the primary determinants of energy availability, fuel choice, end-use 
efficiency, and the amount of GHG emissions; and energy R&D is the vehicle by which new 
technologies become available. To the extent that energy technologies increase or reduce 
society’s range of energy choices, energy R&D is a matter of high importance. In the study, 
we used empirical econometric models to observe the impact of electricity market reforms on 
government energy technology R&D spending. Panel data from 27 countries covering the 
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period from 1974 to 2008 were employed. We found that the progress toward the electricity 
market reform is associated with less government spending on energy technology R&D. The 
most important policy implication of this conclusion is that countries implementing reforms in 
their electricity industries should maintain and increase energy technology R&D budgets as, 
without R&D, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to maintain increased levels of efficiency, 
obtained as a result of reform process, in the middle and long run. Reforms may increase 
efficiency in the short run by reducing costs and removing cross-subsidies; however, it is 
R&D that keeps and advances efficiency in the long term.  
 
While our analysis serves as one of the first steps in assessing the impact of reform process on 
R&D in the energy industry, there is still much room for improvement within the models and 
data presented in this paper. The analysis can be enhanced by incorporating private R&D 
spending into the analysis. Besides, as done in many other similar studies, we treated large 
countries like United States, Japan, Canada and France in the same way as smaller countries 
like Czech Republic and Hungary. In the future studies, new methods should be developed to 
reflect the impact of the size and scale of the countries. More to the point, today there are data 
on electricity market reforms going back about three decades and available data start to let us 
meaningfully establish which market model and industry structure optimize R&D spending in 
the power market.  
 
This study tried to fill the gap in the literature by offering a macro level econometric analysis 
on the possible effects of reform process on public energy technology R&D spending. Even 
with this study, it is obvious that present econometric evidence on the impact of the reform 
process is quite limited. So, there is a definite need for continued analyses of the effect of 
reforms in the electricity industry. Much work needs to be done and there are ample 
opportunities for research in this area. In many countries, power market reform is still an on-
going process, a fact that also underlines the need for continued and up-to-date study. 
Besides, we admit that power market reform is complex and the evidence is difficult to 
evaluate. An exact reckoning of the long-term effects of reforms on R&D will require much 
additional study over longer periods of time. 
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